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THE FALL. By Albert Camus. New York: Vintage Books. 1991 
(Justin O'Brien trans., 1956). Pp.147. $9. 
I. 
If one wishes to revisit a classic, Albert Crunus's The Fall is a risk­
ier choice than Harper Lee's To Kill a Mockingbird,1 which Steven 
Lubet eloquently discussed last year in these pages.2 It is not only that 
Camus's work will be less familiar to legal audiences than Lee's, 
despite the fact that The Fall is becoming recognized through critical 
"revisitation" as perhaps Crunus's greatest novel.3 It is also that the 
legal protagonist of The Fall, Jean-Baptiste Clamence, does not have 
Atticus Finch's immediate appeal. Finch is idealistic, Clamence is ex­
istential; Finch is pious, Clamence is debauched; Finch is hopeful, 
Clamence is mordant; Finch is American, Clamence is French; Finch is 
a lawyer, Clamence is an ex-lawyer who is now a judge-penitent.4 In­
deed, "the fall" of the title describes Clrunence's fall from being an 
idealistic attorney much in the mold of Finch to being the urbane, dis­
solute, and strangely knowing expatriate he is at the time he tells his 
story. At least regarding the question of whether it is possible to live 
greatly in the law, The Fall is a much darker and more disturbing work 
than To Kill a Mockingbird. It is a less charismatic classic - a song of 
experience rather than one of innocence. 
* Associate Professor, Yale Law School. B.A. 1991, Harvard; M.Sc. 1993, Oxford; J.D. 
1996, Yale. - Ed. I thank Akhil Amar, Ariela Dubler, and Carol Rose for their helpful 
suggestions and Rose Saxe for her research assistance. 
1. HARPER LEE, TO KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (1960). 
2. Steven Lubet, Reconstructing Atticus Finch, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1339 (1999) (book re­
view). 
3. See, e.g., PETER BROOKS, TROUBLING CONFESSIONS: SPEAKING GUILT IN LAW AND 
LITERATURE 163 (2000) (noting that The Fall "has only slowly won recognition as possibly 
the greatest of [Camus's] novels"); BRIAN T. FITCH, THE FALL: A MATIER OF GUILT 8-9 
(1995) (noting that, while The Fall is less well-known than Camus's other fiction, it is "his 
most successful creation"); ROSEMARIE JONES, CAMUS: L'ETRANGER AND LA CHUTE 91 
(1st ed. 2d prtg. 1994) (noting that, in her view, The Fall is Camus's "major work of fiction"). 
4. The term "judge-penitent" is not a reference to an existing legal role, but one that 
describes Clamence's self-conception. Here I follow Clamence, who throws out the term 
early in the novel without defining it as a means of encouraging his interlocutor to keep lis­
tening for the answer. P. 8. He writes: "What is a judge-penitent? Ah, I intrigued you with 
that business." P. 17. 
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Yet like many songs of experience, Camus's novel has a polyphony 
that simpler stock narratives about the law - or the simpler stock nar­
ratives that are the law- do not possess. Clamence is too urbane (to 
repeat the adjective that best describes him) to be a lawyer. He has 
seen too far into the world, and too deeply into himself, to believe, or 
even to pretend to believe, in the particularized determinations of 
guilt or innocence that the law requires. His urbanity causes him to 
leave his Finch-like career to adopt a hermit-like existence. He shifts 
from going to court (p. 17) to holding court in seedy bars (p. 3), from 
having many possessions (p. 120) to having little more than steward­
ship over a stolen van Eyck painting (p. 128), from arguing other peo­
ple's cases (p. 3) to ritually confessing his own sins (p. 139). 
So what can we learn from Clamence's urbanity? In my view, it 
most starkly illuminates the nature of confessions. Among literary 
characters, Clamence is perhaps unsurpassed in his grasp of what con­
fessions mean and how they work. To see this, we might begin by 
noting that the entire novel appears to be a monologic confession on 
Clamence's part. At the novel's inception, Clamence strikes up a con­
versation with a stranger in an Amsterdam bar. That conversation 
leads to a series of others over five days, in which Clamence reveals 
more and more about himself. While we discern Clamence respond­
ing to (and sometimes repeating) the stranger's questions, we never 
hear any voice in the novel other than Clamence's own. At the end of 
the novel, Clamence tells his interlocutor that he is engaged in ritual 
confession (p. 139) - like Coleridge's Ancient Mariner, he finds lis­
tener after listener to whom to tell his life story.5 
But while Clamence's confession appears monologic, it is actually 
dialogic in at least two senses. First, the confession is not the same 
confession every time, but is tailored to the listener. "I don't accuse 
myself crudely, beating my breast," Clamence says, "No, I navigate 
skillfully, multiplying distinctions and digressions, too - in short I 
adapt my words to my listener ... " (p. 139). In an important sense, 
then, the monologue is guided by the interlocutor, as captured by 
commentary that seeks to reconstruct the stranger's half of the con­
versation.6 Second, the confession is framed to elicit, and, if we are to 
believe Clamence, always does elicit, a counterconfession from the lis­
tener. The purpose of tailoring his words to the listener, Clamence re­
veals, is to "lead him to go me one better" (p. 139). At one point 
during his confession, Clamence says to the stranger: "Search your 
memory and perhaps you will find some similar story that you'll tell 
me later on" (p. 65). And at the end of the novel, Clamence says to 
5. See Samuel Taylor Coleridge, The Rime of the Ancient Mariner, in THE NORTON 
ANTHOLOGY OF POETRY 431, 445 (Margaret Ferguson et al. eds., 4th ed. 1970) (1817). 
6. See, e.g., FITCH, supra note 3, at 75-96. 
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his interlocutor: "Now I shall wait for you to write me or come back. 
For you will come back, I am sure!" (p. 141). 
Clamence has a theory for why confessions can be so generative. 
Confessions can elicit counterconfessions because everyone is guilty, 
because everyone has something to confess (p. 110). This insight en­
ables an artful individual making a confession to "construct a portrait 
which is the image of all and of no one" (p. 139). When such a portrait 
of guilt is painted, it pricks the conscience of others who recognize 
themselves within it - in Clamence's words, "the portrait I hold out 
to my contemporaries becomes a mirror" (p. 140). That conscience 
seeks absolution in a confession of its own, which may in turn stimu­
late other confessions. The strange fecundity of confessions reflects 
the universality of the guilt that prompts them. 
This urbane view of confessions suggests why Clamence left the le­
gal profession. In the law, confessions are not meant to demonstrate 
universal guilt. To the contrary, the confession is meant to demon­
strate that only the confessant (the individual making the confession) 
is guilty. A confession by one suspect is usually seen to exonerate, 
rather than to implicate, the others. Just as the urbane view situates 
the confession within a generalizing discourse of guilt (the confession 
shows that all are guilty), the legal view situates the confession within 
a particularizing discourse of guilt (the confession shows that some, 
but not others, are guilty). An actor as fully committed to the urbane 
view as Clamence will have difficulty remaining a traditional legal ac­
tor. 
Short of following in Clamence's footsteps and leaving the law, 
what might a legal audience do with the urbane understanding of the 
confession? In this Review, I first more fully describe the urbane view 
by engaging in a close reading of Camus's novel. I then draw on Peter 
Brooks's recent groundbreaking book, Troubling Confessions: 
Speaking Guilt in Law and Literature,1 to consider the difficulties that 
the law has in incorporating the urbane view. In so doing, I turn to a 
classic text - the Miranda8 warning - that the Supreme Court just 
"revisited" this Term,9 to argue that the Miranda warning is a legal at­
tempt to contend with the urbane view. 
II. 
The state of grace from which Jean-Baptiste Clamence falls is not 
so different from that imaginatively occupied by Atticus Finch. 
Clamence tells his interlocutor that only a few years before their con-
7. BROOKS, supra note 3. 
8. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-73 (1966). 
9. See Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326 {2000). 
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versation he was a lawyer in Paris specializing in "noble cases" (p. 17) 
- cases involving widows, orphans, and alleged murderers. He was, 
he claims, "truly above reproach in [his] professional life" (p. 19) and, 
more generally, one of the happy few who are born knowing how to 
live (p. 27). As such, he evaded all unfavorable judgment: "You 
would really have thought that justice slept with me every night. I am 
sure you would have admired the rightness of my tone, the appropri­
ateness of my emotion, the persuasion and warmth, the restrained in­
dignation of my speeches before the court" (p. 17). Judgment was al­
ways directed toward others: "The judges punished and the 
defendants expiated, while I, free of any duty, shielded from judgment 
as from penalty, freely held sway bathed in a light as of Eden" (p. 27). 
Yet Clamence sees in hindsight that his Eden always contained the 
seeds of its own dissolution. First, he comes to recognize the sinister 
aspect of his appetite for good deeds. That aspect is evident even in a 
simple recitation of his incommensurate emotional responses to such 
acts: Clamence describes his love of helping blind people across the 
street (p. 20), his exultation at the approach of a beggar (p. 21), and 
his joy at driving strangers home during transportation strikes (p. 22). 
But Clamence only gradually comes to identify the problem: that he 
gives not out of altruism but to demonstrate his own superiority. He 
recognizes that he has always "needed to feel above" (p. 23). This is a 
literal need - when Clamence says that he has "never felt comfort­
able except in lofty places," he means that he prefers "the bus to the 
subway, open carriages to taxis, terraces to closed-in places" (p. 23). 
Yet it is not only a literal need, for as Clamence notes, his "profession 
satisfied most happily that vocation for summits" (p. 25). And at least 
in its figurative manifestation, the need for heights calls his altruism 
into question. Clamence's virtue ostensibly permits him to attain 
"more than the vulgar ambitious man" and to ascend "to that supreme 
summit where virtue is its own reward" (p. 23). But is virtue truly its 
own reward if the virtuous man takes so much pleasure in surpassing 
the vulgar ambitious one? Clamence comes to answer this question in 
the negative - "When I was concerned with others, I was so out of 
pure condescension ... " (p. 48). 
Clamence also believed in his own perfection because of his unme­
diated access to life - "wasn't that Eden, cher monsieur: no interme­
diary between life and me?" (p. 27). That aspect of Eden, too, is ulti­
mately interrogated. Clamence arrives at the insight that his 
relationship to his life is mediated through forgetting - "I had always 
been aided by an extraordinary ability to forget. I used to forget 
everything, beginning with my resolutions" (p. 49). He cannot re­
member the issues that are ostensibly so important to him: "Funda­
mentally, nothing mattered. War, suicide, love, poverty got my atten­
tion, of course, when circumstances forced me, but a courteous, 
superficial attention . . . .  Everything slid off - yes, just rolled off me" 
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(p. 49). Yet he does not forget quite everything. The only thing that 
he remembers - the only thing that provides coherence - is himself: 
"I lived consequently without any other continuity than that, from day 
to day, of I, I, I" (p. 50). The selectivity of his memory thus again sug­
gests his narcissism. 
If Clamence's forgetfulness reflects his narcissism, it also reinforces 
it. Clamence's conception of himself as perfect is secured only 
through the elision of uncomfortable details. His "fall" from Eden 
therefore occurs as he begins to remember. In describing the primary 
catalyst for the return of his memory, Clamence speaks of an evening 
he spent gazing at the river from the Pont des Arts. He was filled with 
well-being: "I felt rising within me a vast feeling of power and - I 
don't know how to express it - of completion, which cheered my 
heart" (pp. 38-39). Then he heard laughter behind him, traveling 
downstream as if emanating from a boat (p. 39). His heart began to 
beat rapidly, although "there was nothing mysterious about that laugh; 
it was a good, hearty, almost friendly laugh" (p. 39). He walked home, 
feeling dazed, breathing with difficulty, and buying cigarettes he did 
not need (p. 39). At home, he heard laughter again from the street, 
opened the windows, and saw some youths saying goodnight. "I went 
into the bathroom to drink a glass of water. My reflection was smiling 
in the mirror, but it seemed to me that my smile was double . . . " (p. 
40). 
When he initially tells the story, Clamence does not reveal why the 
laughter disturbed him so much. Laughter can imply ridicule and 
judgment, to which Clamence would clearly be sensitive, but the 
laughter was so innocuous, and had so little to do with him, that some­
thing else was obviously in play. But we are forced to wait, as 
Clamence himself may have been forced to wait, for the resurfacing of 
the memory that freighted the laughter with such significance. It is 
only later, in the middle of the novel, that Clamence divulges it. 
The earlier memory is one of crossing the river on a different 
bridge on a night two or three years before the night on the Pont des 
Arts (p. 69). One of the few people in view was a thin young woman 
dressed in black, leaning over the railing of the bridge. The nape of 
her neck caught Clamence's erotic attention. But only momentarily­
he passed on (pp. 69-70). When he had walked fifty yards, he heard 
the sound of a body striking the water, and then "a cry, repeated sev­
eral times, which was going downstream" (p. 70). The sound then 
suddenly stopped. Clamence froze. "I wanted to run and yet didn't 
stir. I was trembling, I believe from cold and shock. I told myself that 
I had to be quick and I felt an irresistible weakness steal over me. I 
have forgotten what I thought then" (p. 70). Finally, he made a deci­
sion. "Then, slowly under the rain, I went away. I informed no one" 
(p. 70). Over the next few days, he did not read the papers. 
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The laughter on the Pont des Arts presumably stirred up this ear­
lier repressed memory because of similarities in the setting, the time, 
and the sound of a human voice getting fainter as it traveled down­
stream. That sound, however, had changed from a cry of anguish to 
laughter. It is easy to read that laughter, and easy to think Clamence 
read it, as laughter about his hypocrisy. Clamence's twin flaws of self­
absorption and forgetfulness are simultaneously indicted - to pre­
serve his narcissistic belief in his own perfection, he actively sought to 
forget the incident and his feelings about it. 
Once this memory surfaces, Clamence radically revises his entire 
self-conception. Clamence maintains that the moment an individual 
opens himself to negative judgment, there is no stopping point - "We 
are forced to take the same precautions as the animal tamer. If, be­
fore going into the cage, he has the misfortune to cut himself while 
shaving, what a feast for the wild animals!" (p. 77). Clamence casts his 
friends in the roles of the animals, who come to ravening judgment at 
the slightest show of weakness (p. 78). Yet it is clear that he is his own 
harshest judge. Under his relentless self-scrutiny, memory begets 
memory, and confession begets confession. Clamence confesses to the 
brutal betrayal of a mistress (pp. 63-65), to cowardice when his honor 
is insulted (pp. 51-53), and to more daily forms of pettiness (p. 85). 
Besides not going to the drowning woman's aid, Clamence's greatest 
sin occurs while he is interned in a German camp in Tunisia during the 
war: "Let's just say I closed the circle when I drank the water of a 
dying comrade" (p. 126). The events on the evening at the Pont des 
Arts were thus evocative of his two greatest sins - he heard the voice 
moving down the river, then returned to his home and drank a glass of 
water. It is thus unsurprising that, as we will see, water becomes an 
important trope for the guilty conscience throughout Clamence's con­
fessional narrative. 
After accepting his own guilt, Clamence becomes unable to carry 
on the profession of a lawyer. Fleeing to Amsterdam, he assumes the 
name of Jean-Baptiste Clamence (pp. 8, 17).10 The name is reminis­
cent of John the Baptist, the last prophet "clamans in deserto."11 That 
10. Clamence divulges early in the novel that he is using a pseudonym (p. 17) and re­
minds us of this fact again (p. 125). He never reveals his real name. 
11. See BROOKS, supra note 3, at 165; JONES, supra note 3, at 58. Qamence makes re­
peated references to himself as a prophet in the wilderness. He observes: "In solitude and 
when fatigued, one is after all inclined to take oneself for a prophet. When all is said and 
done, that's really what I am, having taken refuge in a desert of stones, fogs, and stagnant 
waters - an empty prophet for shabby times ... " (p. 117). Similarly, after describing how 
he "made up [his] mind to leave the society of men," Clamence says, "No, no, I didn't look 
for a desert island; there are no more" (p. 98). While Qamence at one point compares him­
self to Elijah (p. 117), it is clear that he most identifies with John the Baptist. Jones notes 
parallels between Clamence and John the Baptist other than their shared name. For exam­
ple, Clamence, like the Baptist clothed in his camel's hair, wears a camel-hair coat (p. 9). See 
JONES, supra note 3, at 65. Similarly, Clamence pictures his own death as one in which his 
head is displayed to the people (p. 146), as was the Baptist's own head. See id. 
May 2000] Miranda's Fall? 1405 
association is developed by Clamence himself, who speaks of "the bit­
ter water of [his] baptism" (p. 108), which presumably refers to his 
baptism into the consciousness of his own guilt. We might initially in­
terpret his rejection of the legal profession as arising from a fear of 
hypocrisy: How can Clamence, who is culpable himself, participate in 
decisions about the guilt or innocence of others? That interpretation 
finds support in Clamence's repeated comments about how he will 
never be able to evade his own guilt. Building on the symbolic link be­
tween water and guilty conscience, Clamence stresses the inescapable 
nature of each. Boating on the Zuider Zee, Clamence tells his inter­
locutor that he now realizes that the cry of the drowned woman has 
"never ceased, carried by the river to the waters of the Channel, to 
travel throughout the world" (p. 108). He understands that it will wait 
for him "on seas and rivers, everywhere, in short, where lies the bitter 
water of my baptism" (p. 108). Longing to escape "this immense holy­
water font," he asks whether it is "credible that [they should] ever 
reach Amsterdam" (p. 109). Yet Amsterdam offers no escape from 
the water of guilt - as Clamence observes at the novel's inception, 
"Amsterdam's concentric canals resemble the circles of hell" (p.14). 
In speaking of the inescapability of guilty conscience, however, 
Clamence is not speaking only of his own personal predicament. His 
self-conception as John the Baptist suggests that he has not only been 
baptized himself, but that he also baptizes others into a consciousness 
of guilt. That "bitter water" surrounds all who inhabit the atmosphere 
of the novel. Clamence explains that "this country inspires [him]," in 
part because water is so obviously ubiquitous - Holland's people are 
"wedged into a little space of houses and canals, hemmed in by fogs, 
cold lands, and the sea steaming like a wet wash" (p. 12). Moreover, 
throughout the work, there is a "damned humidity" (p. 111) which 
makes it "hard to breathe; the air is so heavy it weighs on one's chest" 
(p. 43). There is also constant rain (p. 12), which only lets up to be­
come snow. The transformation delights Clamence, as he thinks of the 
snow as the feathers of doves flying over Amsterdam.12 The change 
from the transparency of water to the opacity of snow is a momentary 
return from the lucid knowledge of guilt to the blank forgetfulness of 
innocence. But it is, of course, a transient metamorphosis, and one 
that is always ultimately reversed (p. 145). In the end, Clamence con­
cludes that "we cannot assert the innocence of anyone, whereas we 
can state with certainty the guilt of all" (p. 110). Clamence's rejection 
of the lawyer's traditional role thus does not arise out of a simple 
12. P. 145. Earlier in the novel, Clamence makes cryptic references to millions of invisi­
ble doves flying over Amsterdam (pp. 73, 96). As Lucy Melbourne suggests, the doves recall 
the dove that descended to mark Christ as the Redeemer at the time of his baptism. See 
LUCY L. MELBOURNE, DOUBLE HEART 175 (1986). As the feathers of the doves descend 
upon all, they may be read as announcing the innocence and divinity of all. 
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sense of personal disqualification. He believes that no one is innocent 
enough to perform that role. 
Clamence's conclusion that all are guilty again both reflects and 
reinforces his narcissism. Clamence's acknowledgement of his own 
guilt might be seen as a repudiation of his old hubris. But Clamence's 
transcendence over his old self is only partial, as he relinquishes the 
idea of his perfection but not of his superiority. We can see this in the 
quickness of his move from the belief that he is guilty to the belief that 
all are guilty. In this implicit logic - that if even he is guilty, all must 
be guilty - we see something of the old Clamence's narcissism. 
Moreover, Clamence's belief in universal guilt actually reinforces his 
belief in his own superiority, for while all are guilty, only some are 
honest enough to confess their guilt. By doing penance, Clamence 
achieves the moral superiority that permits him to judge his fellow 
human beings. For Clamence is now not simply a penitent, but a 
judge-penitent (p. 8) - he is not only a confessant, but also a confes­
sor. Indeed, he sees the two roles as inextricably linked. He notes 
that ordinary people judge others to protect themselves: "People has­
ten to judge in order not to be judged themselves" (p. 80). Clamence, 
on the other hand, once again aims to surpass the "vulgar ambitious 
man" (p. 23). He seeks "to travel the road in the opposite direction 
and practice the profession of penitent to be able to end up as a judge" 
(p.138). 
The doubleness of Clamence's role shifts in signification in his 
mind from an avoidable hypocrisy to a necessary one. Clamence 
originally speaks of his doubled nature with some derision, speaking of 
his sign as that of "a double face, a charming Janus" (p. 47), expressing 
disquiet at his "double" smile, and saying that he lived his whole life 
under "a double code" (p. 88). But he ultimately comes to peace with 
his double role - "I have accepted duplicity instead of being upset 
about it. On the contrary, I have settled into it and found there the 
comfort I was looking for throughout life" (p. 141). The double role is 
necessitated by the two sides of confession - there must be one to 
hear, and one to speak. But because of the universality of guilt, all 
must assume both roles. This is the urbane view of confession into 
which Clamence baptizes us. 
III. 
After embracing the urbane view of confessions, Clamence leaves 
the law. This is unsurprising, as the law seems uncongenial to the view 
that confessions demonstrate the guilt of us all. To the contrary, legal 
confessions are meant to demonstrate the guilt only of the individual 
who is making the confession. Indeed, the confession is seen today, as 
in the medieval period, as the "queen of proofs," the dispositive mark 
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of individual guilt.13 Thus, those who would wholly embrace the ur­
bane view will not be comfortable within legal discourse. 
Not all who embrace the urbane view, however, have the ability or 
inclination to leave the law. For us, the question remains of how to 
reconcile the legal understanding of the confession with a more ur­
bane cultural one. In answering this question, I advert to Peter 
Brooks's new book on confessions in law and literature.14 This exem­
plary work contextualizes the legal confession within the broader cul­
tural practice of confession, not only as it is conducted in literature, 
but also as it is conducted in religion and psychoanalysis. By doing so, 
it illuminates the necessary reductions that law must make to other 
cultural understandings of confessions in order to function as "the 
law." 
Brooks posits that the legal treatment of confessions is, in many 
ways, an outlier from their treatment in broader culture.15 This thesis 
certainly holds with regard to the urbane view, which is much more 
robustly represented in the literary, psychoanalytic, and religious con­
texts than in the legal one. We have already seen in the literary realm 
that Clamence shifts from confessant to confessor. We can also situate 
Camus's novel within a long literary tradition - extending from The 
Canterbury Tales16 to The Crucible11 - in which the lines between con­
fessants and confessors are blurred. In the religious realm, the 
Catholic tradition has required annual confession of the faithful since 
1215, which means that priests taking confessions must also make 
them.18 Finally, in the psychoanalytic realm, concerns about the trans­
ferential dynamic have led to the requirement that psychoanalysts un­
dergo analysis as part of their training.19 In each of these realms, it is 
recognized that everyone has something to confess, something to work 
through, something about which he feels, or should feel, guilty.20 
13. See BROOKS, supra note 3, at 4. Legal commentators have emphasized that confes­
sions play a crucial role in securing guilty convictions in crinrinal trials. See, e.g., Paul G. 
Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 387, 435-36 
(1996) (collecting commentary). 
14. See generally BROOKS, supra note 3. 
15. See id. at 4-5. 
16. GEOFFREY CHAUCER, THE CANTERBURY TALES (Nevill Coghill trans., 1986) (c. 
1400). 
17. ARTHUR MILLER, THE CRUCIBLE (1953). 
18. See LEON-JOSEPH CARDINAL SUENENS, CORESPONSIBILITY IN THE CHuRCH 108-
09, 118 (Francis Martin trans., 1968). 
19. See 1 RALPH R. GREENSON, THE TECHNIQUE AND P�CTICE OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 
364-65 (1967). 
20. As I have learned from considering confessions in my law-and-literature class, the 
term "confessant" (the individual making the confession) and the term "confessor" (the in­
dividual listening to the confession) are easily mistaken for each other. I believe that this 
confusion arises not only out of the similarity between the two words, but also out of the 
sinillarity between the two roles. 
1408 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 98:1399 
In its rejection of the urbane view, the law emerges as the excep­
tion rather than the rule. Because the law must make ultimate deci­
sions about guilt and innocence, it does not have the same institutional 
license as literature, religion, or psychoanalysis to let confessions 
demonstrate the universality of guilt.21 Rather, it must promulgate the 
view that confessions may, at least in some circumstances, stand as the 
definitive utterance of individual guilt. This is why Clamence's profes­
sion of judge-penitent sounds so paradoxical: in Shakespeare's cele­
brated words, "to offend and judge are distinct offices, [a ]nd of op­
posed natures."22 To distinguish this conception of particularized guilt 
from the urbane one, I will call it the "pragmatic conception." 
Because law may never be entirely unmoored from culture, how­
ever, the pragmatic conception will always have to reckon with the 
pull of the urbane one.23 Indeed, the urbane view often appears to be 
a better description of how confessions work, even in the law. 
Camus's profession of "judge-penitent" seems paradoxical, but it is 
surely no surprise that legal confessors may also have sins of their own 
to confess. While there are many such sins, I will focus in the remain­
der of this discussion on perhaps the most infamous one. This is the 
sin of coercing the confession from the confessant. When such coer­
cion exists, the confession may speak less to the suspect's guilt in 
committing a crime than to the interrogator's guilt in extorting the 
confession. Guilt in the legal realm can thus be as transitive and as 
ambiguous as guilt in the literary one. We might say that the urbane 
conception is not so much absent in the law as repressed by it. 
American constitutional law is thus faced with a dilemma - how 
does it recognize the accuracy of the urbane conception but still sus­
tain the viability of the pragmatic one? The jurisprudence concerning 
the admissibility of confessions may be read as an attempt to give each 
conception its due.24 The urbane view is represented in the fact that 
21. See BROOKS, supra note 3, at 4-5. 
22. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act 2, SC. 9, 11. 61-62 (John 
Russell Brown ed., 7th ed., Methuen & Co. 1959). 
23. See, e.g., Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term - Foreword: Nomos and 
Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4 (1983) (noting that the Jaw is "but a small part of the nor­
mative universe that ought to claim our attention," and therefore cannot be understood in 
isolation "from the narratives that locate it and give it meaning"). 
24. The Supreme Court has relied on a number of separate constitutional provisions to 
determine the admissibility of confessions: 
(1) From 1936 to the present, the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments have been used to exclude involuntary confessions. 
(2) From 1964 to the present, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel has been applied 
in determining the admissibility of a confession obtained from a defendant who has 
been formally charged with a crime. 
(3) Since 1966, the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination has been 
applied to statements made during custodial interrogation; a waiver analysis has 
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courts have entertained the possibility that the suspect's confession 
may not (only) represent the guilt of the suspect, but may (also) repre­
sent the guilt of the interrogator.25 The pragmatic view is represented 
in the fact that the courts entertain that ambiguity only to resolve it -
if admitted, the confession is always held to redound to the guilt only 
of the suspect, rather than testifying to the guilt of both parties (or the 
guilt of us all). Thus, the jurisprudence of confessions recognizes the 
urbane view, but ultimately reduces it to the pragmatic one. I wish to 
suggest that the various phases of the jurisprudence regulating confes­
sions - the pre-Miranda phase, the Miranda phase, and the proposed 
post-Miranda phases - may all be seen as different approaches to this 
reduction.26 
Until shortly before the landmark Miranda decision in 1966, the 
question of whether the confession testified to the guilt of the suspect 
or to the guilt of the interrogator was framed almost exclusively as a 
question of voluntariness under the due process clauses.27 Voluntari­
ness was not determined formulaically, but rather by looking at "the 
totality of all the surrounding circumstances."28 If the suspect con­
fessed "voluntarily," then the confession was admissible as the ulti­
mate proof of the suspect's guilt. If the suspect did not confess volun­
tarily, then the confession was inadmissible. The voluntary/ 
involuntary distinction was thus used to counter the transitive nature 
of confessions, assigning entire responsibility for the confession to one 
party or the other. 
The voluntariness standard, however, merely displaced the inde­
terminacy inhering in the practice of confession onto the analogous 
indeterminacy inhering in the concept of agency. Thus, it was unsur-
prevailed, and the privilege must be shown to have been effectively waived before a 
confession is admissible. 
See STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIELJ. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 511 
{5th ed. 1996). 
25. See infra notes 27-55 and accompanying text. 
26. I acknowledge that these distinctions are very rough, insofar as significant changes 
that occurred within each of these phases will go largely unattended here. See, e.g., Richard 
A. Leo & Welsh S. White, Adapting to Miranda: Modern Interrogators' Strategies of Dealing 
with the Obstacles Posed by Miranda, 84 MINN. L. REV. 397, 407 {1999) (noting that 
"Miranda itself has changed" over the "past thirty-three years," such that it "is no longer one 
case, but rather a body of safeguards that impose less strict safeguards than the original deci­
sion"). 
27. The first Fourteenth Amendment coerced confession case was Brown v. Mississippi, 
297 U.S. 278 (1936), in which the Supreme Court excluded a confession as involuntary. The 
Supreme Court decided thirty-five "voluntariness" cases between 1936 and 1964. In these 
cases, the Court determined on a case-by-case basis how the voluntariness of a confession 
was affected by such factors as the personal characteristics of the accused, circumstances of 
physical deprivation or mistreatment, and psychological influences. See SALTZBURG & 
CAPRA, supra note 24, at 512-14. 
28. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973). 
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prising that the more subtly the pre-Miranda opinions addressed the 
question of volition, the more they approached the urbane view. In 
the 1944 case of Ashcraft v. Tennessee,29 Justice Jackson wrote in dis­
sent that "[t]o speak of any confessions of crime made after arrest as 
being 'voluntary' or 'uncoerced' is somewhat inaccurate, although tra­
ditional."30 This is because "[i]t is probably the normal instinct to deny 
and conceal any shameful or guilty act."31 Jackson thus pointed out 
that the mere fact that the confession was made suggests that the con­
fessant's will was overborne. This analysis is consonant with 
Clamence's teaching that all confessions are effectively co-written by 
confessant and confessor. 
To the extent that the voluntariness standard tacks close to the ur­
bane view, we should expect it to be unworkable. Brooks focuses on 
Culombe v. Connecticut,32 one of the major cases leading up to 
Miranda, to make the point that sophistication in this realm can be 
impractical.33 In Culombe, Justice Frankfurter wrote a sixty-seven 
page "treatise" on the voluntariness standard, which sets forth a three­
part test. The courts are to determine "the crude historical facts," 
then to engage in the "imaginative recreation, largely inferential, of 
internal, 'psychological' fact," and finally to apply "to this psychologi­
cal fact . . .  standards for judgment informed by the larger legal con­
ceptions ordinarily characterized as rules of law but which, also, com­
prehend both induction from, and anticipation of, factual 
circumstances."34 Merely articulating this version of the test should 
vindicate Justice Warren's criticism in his Culombe concurrence that 
lower courts and law enforcement agencies would receive little guid­
ance "from the treatise for which this case seems to have provided a 
vehicle."35 In 1985, the Court offered a retrospective of scholarly cri­
tiques of the voluntariness test, noting that "[t]he voluntariness rubric 
has been variously condemned as 'useless,' 'perplexing,' and 'legal 
'double-talk.' "36 "Voluntariness" was thus a false rescue from the ur­
bane view of confession. 
Because of the incoherence of the voluntariness standard, it 
" 'seemed inevitable that the Court would seek 'some automatic de­
vice by which the potential evils of incommunicado interrogation 
29. 322 U.S. 143 (1944). 
30. Id. at 161 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
31. Id. at 160 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
32. 367 U.S. 568 (1961). 
33. See BROOKS, supra note 3, at 65-87. 
34. Culombe, 367 U.S. at 603 (Frankfurter, J., plurality opinion). 
35. Id. at 656 (Warren, C.J., concurring). 
36. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 116 n.4 (1985) (citations omitted) (collecting com­
mentary). 
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[could] be controlled.' ' "37 Five years after Culombe, the Court found 
its automatic device in Miranda v. Arizona.38 The holding of Miranda 
was that the famous four-part warning (or a legislatively written 
equivalent) had to be recited for a confession to be deemed volun­
tary.39 Yet it was entirely predictable that the warning would shift 
from being a quasi-necessary condition40 for the admissibility of a con­
fession to becoming a quasi-sufficient one.41 The rule's distinction be­
tween warning and nonwarning tracks the desired distinction between 
volition and coercion so closely that it is unsurprising that legal actors 
often intuit a close correlation between them.42 And, relative to volun­
tariness, the presence or absence of the Miranda warning is easily veri­
fiable - it is not an interior state, but a public utterance. 
Miranda thus successfully disrupts the dynamic described by the 
urbane view of confessions. The urbane view suggests that confessions 
describe a guilt beyond that of the speaker, provoking a counter­
confession by the individual who hears the confession regarding his 
own guilt. Reading the criminal confession into this paradigm con­
jures up the image of a police officer forcing a confession from a sus­
pect, and then being required in a pre-Miranda voluntariness inquiry 
to confess his own bad deeds in extorting the confession.43 In 
37. YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 458 (8th ed. 1994) (al­
teration in original) (quoting Geoffrey R. Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 
1977 SUP. Cr. REV. 99, 103 (quoting WALTER v. SCHAFER, THE SUSPECT AND SOCIETY: 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND CONVERGING CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE 10 (1967))). 
38. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
39. The four warnings are: (1) that the suspect has the right to remain silent; (2) that 
any statements he makes can be used against him; (3) that he has the right to the presence of 
an attorney during questioning; and (4) that he will be provided with an attorney if he can­
not afford one. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). 
40. Cases following Miranda have narrowed its protections such that the warning is not 
strictly necessary to use the confession in certain ways. See, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 
U.S. 649, 657 (1984) (creating a general "public safety" exception to Miranda); Michigan v. 
Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 433 (1974) (holding admissible the testimony of a witness whose iden­
tity had been learned by questioning the defendant without a full Miranda warning); Harris 
v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 222 (1971) (holding that statements obtained without a full 
Miranda warning may be used to impeach the defendant's credibility). 
41. The Miranda warning does not exempt police officers from further scrutiny as to the 
voluntariness of the confession. See KAMISAR ET AL., supra note 37, at 458 n.c. The warn­
ing, however, has been described as providing them with a "safe harbor." See CHARLES 
FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION: A FIRST-HAND 
ACCOUNT 45 (1991) (noting author's impression as Solicitor General that "most professional 
law enforcement organizations had learned to live with Miranda, and even to love it, to the 
extent that it provided them with a safe harbor"). 
42 See, e.g., Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 109, 123 
(1998) (arguing that Miranda created an isomorphism between warning/nonwarning and vo­
lition/coercion). 
43. In contrast to the literary model, of course, the compulsion on the part of the inter­
rogator to confess his bad deeds will usually not be internal. Rather, that compulsion will 
come from the legal proceedings themselves. Yet the very fact that those proceedings direct 
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Camusian fashion, the original confessor becomes the confessant. Af­
ter Miranda, however, the link between the suspect's confession and 
the officer's confession is broken. So long as the police officer is 
canny enough to mouth the words of the Miranda warning, the sus­
pect's subsequent confession is much more likely to be deemed volun­
tary, and the police officer's own acts may go unconfessed. 
In this sense, the Miranda warning may be seen as a form of anti­
confession, a circuit breaker that disrupts the generativity of the con­
fession. This is true not only for the officer, who can be protected by 
the warning from many forms of subsequent scrutiny, but also for the 
suspect. For the suspect, the warning by itself is unlikely to prompt the 
suspect to make a confession. This is because it formalizes the rela­
tionship between officer and suspect. A set text that reveals nothing 
about its individual speaker, it informs the suspect of his substantive 
rights. This has the effect of reminding the suspect that the officer is 
not a sympathetic confessor, and that the legal modality of confession 
is in this way an outlier from many other models of confession extant 
in our culture. It also prevents the officer from entirely tailoring his 
narrative to the individual suspect in a Clamence-like manner. Think 
how much less likely the stranger of The Fall would have been to 
make his confession if Clamence had administered the warning at the 
beginning of his artful narrative! Conversely, think of the cases in 
which suspects are encouraged to make confessions because the inter­
rogator tells exactly this kind of a narrative.44 
In this Term's Dickerson v. United States,45 the Supreme Court pre­
served the Miranda framework from a 1968 Congressional statute that 
sought to reinstate the pre-Miranda status quo.46 In reaching its result, 
the Court first had to determine whether Miranda had announced a 
constitutional rule, which Congress could not supersede, or a noncon­
stitutional rule, which Congress could alter at will.47 After deciding 
themselves at the potential guilt of the interlocutor suggests that the confessional scene is 
being read through the urbane paradigm. 
44. See, e.g., Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 {1977). In Brewer, a police officer drove a 
man suspected of murdering a ten-year-old girl from Davenport, Iowa to Des Moines with 
the understanding that the suspect would not be questioned until he met with his lawyer at 
his destination. See id. at 390-91. While the officer did not ask the suspect any questions, he 
told a vivid narrative about how the heavy snow forecasted for that evening would cover the 
body of the girl by the time they reached their destination. See id. at 392. The officer went 
on to suggest that the suspect, whom he knew to be deeply religious, was the only individual 
who could enable the parents to find the girl in time to give her a Christian burial. See id. at 
393. The suspect broke down and led the officer to the body. See id. The Supreme Court 
found that this process had violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel, 
noting that the detective's narrative sought "to elicit information from [the suspect] just as 
surely as - and perhaps more effectively than - if he had formally interrogated him." Id. 
at 399. 
45. Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000). 
46. 18 u.s.c. § 3501 (1994). 
47. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2332-33. 
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that the Miranda framework had a constitutional dimension, the Court 
then considered whether the statute actually sought to supersede that 
framework. This question was slightly complicated by the fact that 
Miranda itself accorded Congress and state legislatures some power to 
develop alternatives to its four-part warning. Miranda stated that its 
framework was not intended to be a "constitutional straitjacket"48 and 
that its holding permitted legislatures to replace the warning with 
"procedures which are at least as effective."49 The Dickerson Court 
quickly dispensed with this potential complication by observing that 
the statute sought to reinstate the framework that pre-dated Miranda, 
in which a judicial finding of voluntariness in light of the totality of the 
circumstances was not only necessary, but also sufficient, to render a 
confession admissible.50 Reasoning that the Miranda Court had al­
ready rejected this framework as constitutionally inadequate, the 
Dickerson Court struck down the statute.51 
It bears emphasis that the Dickerson Court did not hold that the 
words of the Miranda warning were constitutionally required. 
Dickerson did not overrule the portion of Miranda that suggested that 
its constitutional requirement could be satisfied by "procedures which 
are at least as effective" as the four-part warning. It simply noted that 
the pre-Miranda voluntariness paradigm did not provide such a proce­
dure. Thus, while Dickerson bars a return to the pre-Miranda regime, 
it theoretically permits an advance to some third regime in which the 
warning is retired.52 
But while the Dickerson Court did not formally require the words 
of the warning, it strongly suggested that they are here to stay. To­
ward the end of its opinion, the Court noted that the doctrine of stare 
decisis also supported its holding. It stated: "Whether or not we 
would agree with Miranda's reasoning and its resulting rule, were we 
addressing the issue in the first instance, the principles of stare decisis 
weigh heavily against overruling it now."53 As part of that analysis, the 
Court described the reliance interest that had developed around the 
words of the warning, stating that "Miranda has become embedded in 
48. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966). 
49. Id. 
50. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at2335. 
51. Id. 
52. Academic commentators have suggested alternatives to the Miranda warning other 
than the voluntariness paradigm. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar & Ren e- B. Lettow, Fifth 
Amendment - First Principles: The Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REV. 857, 909 
(1995) (suggesting, inter alia, "a prophylactic rule that no police-station confession by a de­
fendant is ever allowed in, unless volunteered by a suspect in the presence of an on-duty de­
fense lawyer or ombudsman in the police station"); Cassell, supra note 13, at 496-97 (sug­
gesting, inter alia that a modified warning be given that eliminates the offer of counsel, and 
that confessions be videotaped). 
53. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2336. 
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routine police practice to the point where the warnings have become 
part of our national culture."54 Literary scholars have posited that 
Shakespeare named his Miranda to draw on the name's associations to 
the words "admiration" and "wonder."55 The Court's stare decisis 
analysis maintained that whether we admire the Miranda warning or 
not, we should give weight to the fact that its uptake in our culture has 
been wondrous. 
What the Court implied, then, is that the longevity of the Miranda 
warning may be less assured by the Constitution (which does not re­
quire the words of the warning) than by the warning's status as a cul­
tural icon.56 Elaine Scarry elegantly observes that "[s]ometimes it may 
even happen that a just legal principle has the good fortune to be for­
mulated in a sentence whose sensory features reinforce the availability 
of the principle to perception."57 While she focuses on the opening 
cadences of the Declaration of Independence as her example,58 the 
Miranda warning also bears out her claim. This easily memorized 
quatrain has been immensely successful in making our constitutional 
rights available to perception: It has been observed that "[s]chool 
children are more likely to recognize Miranda warnings than the 
Gettysburg Address."59 Indeed, the Miranda warning might make us 
wonder why we do not frame more of our laws in a form that would 
facilitate their dissemination. If this seems fanciful, recall that the 
Greeks deliberately embodied law-like mores in poetry to ensure their 
broad dissemination in a primarily oral culture.60 As a popular poem 
that serves as a legal mnemonic, the Miranda warning can be read as a 
serendipitous throwback to this tradition. And while the Court obvi­
ously did not endorse such a practice, it did recognize that deference 
was due to formulations of legal rules that had found broad uptake in 
54. Id. 
55. When Ferdinand first learns Miranda's name in The Tempest, he calls her "Admir'd 
Miranda! I Indeed the top of admiration! worth I what's dearest to the world." WILLIAM 
SHAKESPEARE, THE TEMPEST act 3, sc. 1, II. 37-39 (Frank Kermode ed., 6th ed. Harvard 
Univ. Press 1958). In his annotation to this passage, Frank Kermode notes that "[h]ere 
Shakespeare plays upon the name he has invented for his last heroine." Id. at 74. In his 
commentary to a different edition, Robert Langbaum points out that in Latin, "Miranda" 
means "wonderful." See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TEMPEST 83 (Robert Langbaum 
ed., Signet Classic 1964). 
56. Cf. Akhil Reed Amar, OK, All Together Now: "You Have the Right to . . . ,"L.A. 
TIMES, Dec. 12, 1999, at Ml, M6 (contending, prior to the Supreme Court's decision in 
Dickerson, that because of the popularization of the Miranda warning through television, the 
warning is "here to stay, in our heads if not our lawbooks"). 
57. ELAINE SCARRY, ON BEAUTY 102 (1999). 
58. See id. at 102-03. 
59. THE MIRANDA DEBATE: LAW, JUSTICE, AND POLICING xv (Richard A. Leo & 
George C. Thomas III eds., 1998). 
60. See M. ETHAN KATSH, THE ELECTRONIC MEDIA AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
LAW 25-27 (1989). 
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the culture. Once such uptake is taken into account, we might ask 
whether any alternative could be "at least as effective" as the warning. 
Here an ironic conclusion leaps to the eye of the law-and-literature 
scholar. One truism in the law-and-literature field is that law is coer­
cive, while literature is merely persuasive.61 In the context of confes­
sions, however, literature appears to wield greater force than the law 
in at least two ways. First, it is the literary (or more broadly, the cul­
tural) conception of the confession - in which the confession gener­
ates more and more guilt - that the law is desperately, and oftentimes 
unsuccessfully, attempting to cabin. Second, the most successful way 
to date in which the law has been able to restrain the literary fecundity 
of the confession has been through the Miranda warning, which is it­
self a kind of literary form - a poem. The jurisprudence of confes­
sions, then, doubly inverts the traditional hierarchy of law over litera­
ture. The great literary power of the confession is being tamed by the 
great literary power of the Miranda warning. One literary form has 
generated another in a way of which even the urbane Clamence might 
approve. 
61. See, e.g., Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1609, 1610 
(1986). 
